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The Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr' initiated a
brief but highly significant period in the constitutional life of the
nation during which the Court moved quickly, aggressively, and
effectively to eliminate population inequalities in political
representation at every level of American government. By the time
the Court decided Avery v. Midland County2 in 1968, it had imposed
the doctrine of one person, one vote on virtually every jurisdiction at
every level of governance that had chosen to rule itself through a
representative body comprised of more than one member. Following
this series of rulings, which brought about what has been aptly termed
a "reapportionment revolution,"3 jurisdictions across the country,
from the national and state levels down to the smallest council-
* Professor of Law, State University of New York, University at Buffalo School of
Law. Thanks to Jim Wooten for comments on an earlier draft. Paige Junker provided
valuable research assistance.
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
3. See GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REvOLUTION:
REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966).
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governed village, were required to review and in most cases to revise
the ways in which they determined the composition of their basic
institutions of self-governance.
In construing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to require a top-to-bottom regime of one person, one
vote, the Court not only formally rejected, but also decisively
delegitimized, the new doctrine's logical and historical alternative:
one community, one vote. The systems of representation the Court
displaced typically allocated representation in governing bodies not to
equipopulous groups of individuals, but to the various counties,
towns, neighborhoods, or other subcommunities of which the larger
jurisdiction was understood to be comprised.4 The one-person, one-
vote standard displaced such systems by putting every jurisdiction to a
stark choice. On one hand, a jurisdiction could comply with one
person, one vote by aggregating itself into a single, undifferentiated
political community and selecting all representatives collectively
using at-large voting.5 On the other hand, a jurisdiction could also
comply by continuing to allocate representation among politically
recognized subdivisions, but only if it redefined their boundaries after
each decennial census to achieve population equality across all
subdivisions. In either case, traditionally recognized subcommunities
were rendered politically irrelevant either by being submerged into
the whole, or by being broken up and rearranged into new groupings,
not just once, but every ten years, to maintain compliance with the
constitutional requirement of equal population.
In its heavy emphasis on the individual as the appropriate unit of
political power, and its corresponding indifference to local
community as an organizing principle for the exercise of political
power, the one-person, one-vote standard seems to reflect an
underlying liberal nationalism that elevates to primacy the
relationship of individuals to the nation and to one another,
unmediated by intermediate community groupings. Certainly the
doctrine has been applied in a way that seems calculated to flatten
and homogenize local identity, a process likely to disrupt the
4. See 14 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 58-62 (1962-63).
5. This mode of compliance was soon eliminated for jurisdictions that used at-large
voting as a means of racial discrimination. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66
(1973); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,48
(1986). Where at-large systems have been used for discriminatory purposes, division of
the multimember jurisdiction into equipopulous districts has long been the Court's remedy
of choice. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1975); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,




formation in any given place of a politics based upon meaningful,
organic, local political community. If it is true that "[t]he civic
experience... is fundamentally local,' 6 then the one-person, one-vote
standard, by undermining the local, may also undermine the
possibility of the civic experience itself. If so, the doctrine may
achieve formal political equality only by exacting a heavy,
unanticipated price.
In this Essay, I examine two related questions. First, is the one-
person, one-vote standard actually incompatible with the
development of a meaningful community-based local politics?
Second, if it is, what justifies the Court's application of the doctrine in
such a way as to preclude states and localities from structuring their
political institutions so as to create and foster such a politics, should
they deem it desirable to do so? Part I of the Essay takes a first cut at
the problem by laying out the case for the proposition that the one-
person, one-vote standard is liberal and nationalizing at the expense
of local community. Part II examines potential alternative
representational structures, including one community, one vote, in
which established communities rather than groups of individuals are
represented, and explores why such structures might be desirable and
how they might be institutionalized. Part III takes a second cut at the
problem by inquiring more closely whether the two kinds of
structures really are so fully incompatible that the interests served by
both cannot be accommodated under a constitutional rule of one
person, one vote. I conclude that the two regimes are deeply in
tension. Finally, Part IV explores some possible justifications for
resolving this tension as the Court has: by discouraging the
coalescence of meaningful local political community. Specifically,
Part IV raises the possibility that a cosmopolitan uniformity might be
preferable to a free-wheeling local differentiation because the latter,
at least in the United States, too often serves as a ready cover for
racial discrimination.
I. ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND LIBERAL NATIONALISM
According to Tip O'Neill, the consummate politician and former
Speaker of the House, all politics is local7 O'Neill's dictum, however,
6. Lawrence Cahoone, Locale and Progress 3 (Aug. 31, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting),
available at http://pro.harvard.eduabstracts/002/002022CahooneLaw.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
7. TnP O'NEILL & GARY HYMEL, ALL POLITICS Is LOCAL, AND OTHER RULES OF
THE GAME (1994).
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is misleading: all politics may be local, but not all forms of local
politics are equivalent. One way in which forms of politics may differ
is in their "thickness." Liberal theories typically advance a somewhat
thin notion of democracy that conceives of politics as a forum for the
mutual pursuit of self-interest.8 In this model, rational individuals
choose their own goods, and then enter the political arena for the
purpose of striking instrumental bargains designed to protect their
liberties and advance their interests.9 Individuals often join with
others in politics, but in this model coalitions are evanescent and
shifting, and last only so long as mutual advantage holds them
together. 10
In contrast, communitarian and civic republican theories advance
a thicker conception of democracy in which citizens are firmly
situated by membership in a meaningful political community that
partly constitutes their values and desires." Citizenship, in this
model, is a demanding social role that requires individuals to lead
political lives dedicated to the pursuit of the common good of their
communities. 2 On this view, individuals join with others not
primarily because they choose to (although they have some agency in
the matter), but because membership in the groups to which they
belong contributes fundamentally to constituting their identities-it
helps make them who they are. Separation from one's group, then, is
not something to be undertaken lightly, for it may inflict a potentially
8. See, e.g., BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS
FOR A NEW AGE 4 (1984) ("Liberal democracy is thus a 'thin' theory of democracy, one
whose democratic values are prudential and thus provisional, optional, and conditional-
means to exclusively individualistic and private ends.").
9. See, e.g., MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT 4-7 (1996).
10. This aspect of the theory, often known as interest pluralism, is especially well-
developed in the empirical political science literature. See ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE
PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (Peter H. Odegard ed., Belknap Press 1967) (1908); ROBERT
A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO
GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961); DAVID B.
TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC
OPINION (1951).
11. MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forewords Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 11-25 (1983); Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4,17-36 (1986).
12. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 23 (1993); Amy Guttmann,
The Disharmony of Democracy, in DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY: NOMOS XXXV, at 126,
141 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of
Democracy in American Constitutional Argument Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 489
(1989); Michelman, supra note 11, at 4,33,40.
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serious injury by depriving a person of a significant constitutive
element of his or her identity.13
The Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote standard seems
plainly to contemplate a democratic politics of the thin variety. First,
by measuring the equality of citizens in terms of the fractional value
of their vote, the standard tends to equate citizenship narrowly with
voting, and to define participation in politics by reference to a voter's
bargaining strength. In the Court's view, citizenship is exercised
primarily by voting for legislators. 4 Malapportionment is thus a
direct affront to citizenship because it dilutes the value of votes cast in
large districts compared to the value of votes cast in smaller districts.15
For the Court, in other words, equality in politics means that
everybody comes to the table with the same grubstake. One who is
forced to play the game of politics with less than the standard stake
"is that much less a citizen.'
16
Second, the one-person, one-vote standard tends to portray
citizens abstractly, outside of any concrete context in which they
might actually exercise the privileges or undertake the burdens of
citizenship. The "fundamental principle of representative
government in this country," the Court has held, "is one of equal
representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to...
place of residence." 7 It is not enough, then, that citizens may enjoy
equal status within the community in which they live; their status as
citizens is something universal, to be measured against the status of
citizens everywhere: "all voters, as citizens of a State, stand in the
same relation regardless of where they live." 8 This is a cosmopolitan
view that treats citizens as largely equivalent and interchangeable,
rather than as unique members of distinct communities.
Third, by ignoring the relation of individuals to local
communities or of local subcommunities to one another, the one-
person, one-vote standard tends to undermine the possibility that an
13. ALISDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 33-34
(2d ed. 1984).
14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (stating that "each and every citizen
has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes" of the
state; "[m]ost citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters through the
election of legislators").
15. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (stating that malapportionment
"contracts the value of some votes and expands that of others," giving them different
"weight").
16. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567.
17. Id. at 560-61.
18. Id at 565.
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enduring link might be forged between persons, places, and politics.
Under the standard, localities are understood to lack political
integrity: "Political subdivisions," the Court said in Reynolds v. Sims,
"have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental
instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of
state governmental functions."'19  If localities are not discrete
communities with some kind of political integrity, but are instead
mere administrative subdivisions of the state, then their boundaries,
their functions, their powers-even the number and identity of their
inhabitants-are nothing more than artifacts of the exercise of
centralized power, the kind of power that, the Court intimates, serves
as the true organizing structure around which genuine citizenship can
only coalesce.
This point of view makes it possible for the Court to construe
one person, one vote to require decennial redistricting for the
purpose of maintaining population equality among political
subdivisions. The process of constantly redrawing electoral district
boundaries, however, is one that must deeply stress, if it does not
actually erase, the political significance of local boundaries. A
boundary that is continually moving is one that is unlikely to serve as
any kind of imaginative focal point for communal identity,20 much less
as a dividing line between genuinely distinct political communities. In
this way, one person, one vote continually impedes the formation (or
re-formation) of meaningful local political identity. Moreover, even
if some kind of local identity can flourish under these circumstances,
the redistricting process would seem to exert a homogenizing
pressure by continually linking and unlinking different groups of
individuals to particular places and to other groups of individuals.
Redistricting thus flattens identity within a jurisdiction by preventing
subcommunities from enjoying the kind of stability and sense of
permanence that are necessary ingredients for communal self-
identification and, ultimately, differentiation.
Finally, redistricting inevitably creates a population of political
transients-people who, though they never physically relocate, are
19. Id. at 575. This doctrine goes back in federal constitutional law to Hunter v.
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
20. BENEDICr ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECrIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 163-78 (1983). As Liah Greenfeld has observed,
because of the ideological nature of American nationalism, one of the earliest disputes
faced by Americans concerned "what was to be the concrete geo-political referent of the




taken from one district and placed in another to satisfy the demands
not of community, but of population equality.21 Local political bonds
of any significance cannot be made and unmade by government fiat,
of course, and the process of district reassignment thus can only
further weaken the bonds of political and communal affiliation.
To put this another way, we might ask: what kind of political
community could survive application of the one-person, one-vote
standard and the decennial process of redistricting? Such a
community would have to be one whose members judge their political
power in their own community by comparing it to the political power
exercised by complete strangers in other communities, and who
derive no significant cues about their political identity from the
physical place in which they engage in politics, the boundaries of their
political jurisdiction, or the identity of those with whom they
collectively engage in local politics. Membership in such a
community could not easily rest on personal loyalties or commitments
to particular places, people, or groups. The community's members
would be cosmopolitan, neither belonging deeply to nor strongly
concerned with the place in which they lived. Such a community
would be liberal; it would be national; it would be thin.
II. THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF COMMUNITIES
A. The Origins of Community Representation
The roots of Anglo-American political representation lie in the
representation of communities, not individuals. Originally,
representation in Parliament was a metaphorical representation of
the land itself. Landholding in feudal England carried with it certain
obligations, among them the duty to provide various forms of aid to
the crown, including, upon request, financial assistance.22 Because, by
tradition and under Magna Charta, financial impositions could not be
assessed without the consent of those tenured in the lord's land,
representatives of the land were summoned to Parliament for the
purpose of giving their consent to taxation. Thus, representation in
21. Aleinikoff and Issacharoff memorably referred to such individuals as "filler
people" in T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:
Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588,601 (1993).
22. M.V. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT 253 (1964).
23. G.L. Harriss, The Formation of Parliament, 1272-1377, in THE ENGLISH
PARLIAMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 41 (R.G. Davies & J.H. Denton eds., 1981)
[hereinafter THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT]; WILLIAM STUBBS, 2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 199-201 (1880).
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England was "not the offspring of a democratic theory," but "an
unpleasant incident of feudal service."'24
By the early fourteenth century, the rise of wealth not derived
from rights in land created new potential sources of royal revenue.
To put these sources within reach while still satisfying the
requirement of consent, representation in Parliament was expanded
to include representatives from corporate towns and boroughs.2
Although town representatives may have been understood to
represent roughly the interests of non-geographic mercantile classes,
26
they were nevertheless selected, in keeping with the universal
practice, from "geographically defined communities."27 In England, it
seems, "political geography was deemed to determine something
essential."8 Yet this something inhered in the place rather than its
inhabitants or its representatives, for any relationship among them
had no bearing on the nature of representation. Thus, because feudal
service was deemed to be due "from the land rather than from the
individual tenant,.., so long as the crown obtained its service it cared
little who performed it."29 Representation was consequently based on
the unit from which consent was required, irrespective of any other
characteristic, including who or how many happened to live there, or
even the amount of revenue due from the taxable unit.30 Thus, by the
late fourteenth century, the representatives in Parliament consisted of
two knights from each county and two citizens or burgesses from each
city or borough within the represented counties, regardless of
population, wealth, or property value.
31
This model was duly exported to America, where representation
in colonial legislatures was allocated on a per-town basis. In
Maryland in the 1640s, for example, the assembly was constituted by
"each community in the colony choosing, by majority rule, a
representative who would stand for the whole community... [and
who] would cast a single vote in the assembly, regardless of the size of
24. A.F. POLLARD, THE EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT 109,153 (1920).
25. See POLLARD, supra note 24, at 51-55; STUBBS, supra note 23, at 170-71, 176,
208-10.
26. STUBBS, supra note 23, at 210.
27. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 41 (1988).
28. CLARKE, supra note 22, at 285.
29. POLLARD, supra note 24, at 156.
30. For a thorough discussion of medieval taxation policies, see G.L. HARRISS, KING,
PARLIAMENT, AND PUBLIC FINANCE IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND TO 1369 (1975).
31. A.L. Brown, Parliament, c. 1377-1422, in THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, supra note
23, at 109, 117-18.
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United States they reached their culmination in the Baker line of
cases.
We can of course no longer justify communal representation in
relation to rights in land, but liberalism does not provide the only
conceivable model for reconceptualizing the historical Anglo-
American model of political representation of communities.
Alternative political theories of more recent vintage that focus as
much on the community as on the individuals who constitute it
provide a framework in which it is possible to perceive important
benefits from the former system's stress on the independence,
political integrity, and permanence of local communities-aspects of
political community to which the Court has been, it seems, largely
indifferent.
B. The Importance of Local Political Community: Contemporary
Views
If formal, universal equality and a cosmopolitan orientation
toward centralized power are the most desirable characteristics of a
political system, the Court is surely correct that one person, one vote
is the representational structure of choice. Clearly, a system of one
community, one vote can be desirable only on some very different set
of assumptions. What might these be? It seems to me that any
satisfactory account of such a system would have to explain why it is
important for democratic politics to be conducted in a community
that is (1) local, (2) comparatively permanent, and (3) situated in a
particular, concretely identifiable place. In light of space limitations,
I shall attempt here only the briefest review of how these issues are
handled by some contemporary, non-liberal theories of democracy.
All of the theories I discuss below share three fundamental premises:
that politics consists of much more than merely voting; that the self
who participates in politics, defined in this broader sense, is strongly
situated by living a particular life, among particular people, in a
particular place; and that citizenship means living such a life well,
with due regard to the common good of one's fellow citizens.
One group of theories emphasizing the importance of the local
clusters around the concept of what is sometimes known as
"developmental democracy. ' 40  Theories of developmental
prerequisite to meaningful legislative representation. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 160-75 (1967).
40. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 72-102 (1987); C.B. MACPHERSON,
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 44-69 (1977).
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the community he represented. 3 2 In Massachusetts, representatives
represented towns; in Virginia, plantations, hundreds, or counties;
and in the Carolinas, parishes 3 This approach persisted well into the
eighteenth century. Vermont, in its first constitution of 1777
allocated one representative to each town in the state3M The 1776
constitutions of Virginia and North Carolina provided for an
assembly composed of two representatives from every county, and
one from each city or borough.35  Although some early state
constitutions took rough account of population in determining the
number of representatives to which each jurisdiction was entitled,
representation was always allocated to counties, parishes, or some
other communal unit.36
From the seventeenth century onward, accelerating changes in
the nature and distribution of economic and political power,
ideological developments, the rise of nationalism, and the expansion
of the franchise eventually wore away at the prevailing model of
parliamentary representation.37  Liberal principles of popular
sovereignty could not be squared with feudal notions of the
representation of land and taxation as a feudal service, or with
received traditions based on such principles. Instead, it became
necessary to reconceptualize parliamentary representation as the
political representation of the people in their collective capacity.38 By
the early nineteenth century, these ideological developments
produced the first serious legislative efforts at reforming the badly
malapportioned representational system in Great Britain,39 and in the
32. MORGAN, supra note 27, at 40.
33. ld. at 41.
34. VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ VII, XI (1777).
35. N.C. CONST. art. 111 (1776); VA. CONST. 25 (1776).
36. E.g., MASS. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1780) (townships); S.C. CONST. art. XI (1776)
(parishes). For a thorough account of how representation was handled in revolutionary-
era state constitutions, see MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY:
STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 65-76 (1997).
37. D.H. Pennington, A Seventeenth-Century Perspective, in THE ENGLISH
PARLIAMENT, supra note 23, at 185, 189-90; POLLARD, supra note 24, at 157-65.
38. MORGAN, supra note 27, at 46-50.
39. G.J. PULZER, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND ELECTIONS: PARTIES AND
VOTING IN GREAT BRITAIN 32-33 (Malcolm Anderson ed., 1967). Interestingly, so
complete was the shift to a national orientation that reapportionment in Britain was
initially resisted on the Burkean ground that the broad, general outlook of the
representatives made direct representation of any given community, group, or interest
unnecessary. See David Eastwood, Parliament and Locality: Representation and
Responsibility in Late-Hanoverian England, in 17 PARLIAMENT AND LOCALITY, 1660-
1939, at 68 (David Dean & Clyve Jones eds., 1998). Similar arguments were, however,
resisted in America, where a strong acquaintance with local conditions was deemed to be a
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democracy hold that democracy is justified primarily by its effect on
the citizenry. Active participation in a democratic polity creates
informed, politically aware, and public-spirited citizens who, as a
result of participating jointly in the public enterprise of collective self-
government, enjoy meaningful membership in a genuine
community.41 In some accounts, democratic citizenship is understood
as the ultimate fulfillment of human life, and thus an end in itself.
This view has its roots in Aristotelian notions of the political nature of
human beings,42 and probably found its most influential modem
expression in the writings of John Stuart Mill.43 A more recent
version of developmental democracy focuses on the institution of
"participatory democracy." Advocates of participatory democracy
contend that the machinery of government must be radically opened
to popular participation and control, primarily by distributing
meaningful power downward toward decentralized local bodies small
enough to allow individual citizens to experience self-government in
an authentic way.'
In these theories, political participation is thought to be most
effective and most meaningful when undertaken at the local level.
Generally, participation is most meaningful when it is a means by
which citizens can play a significant role in shaping the decisions that
affect their lives.45 For this condition to hold, citizens must feel that
there is some reasonable prospect for their participation to lead
eventually to actions that affect them.46 The local arena thus provides
a much more congenial environment for citizens to derive the
developmental benefits of democratic participation than national or
other comparatively remote levels of government because the
opportunities for participation are more numerous on the local level,
and because individuals can make more of a difference in small-scale
local politics.
41. HELD, supra note 40, at 72, 80, 86-89; MACPHERSON, supra note 40, at 47-48,51-
52.
42. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS I.ii, § 9, at 4-5 (1253a) (Ernest Barker ed. & trans.,
1978).
43. JOHN STUART MILL, Considerations on Representative Government, in ON
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 205,328-329 (John Gray ed., 1998).
44. See CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY passim
(1970); PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS: NOMOS XVI passim (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1975); THE CASE FOR PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY passim (C. George
Benello & Dimitrios Roussopoulos eds., 1971).
45. MILL, supra note 43, at 328.
46. BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 117-39 (1984); David Braybrooke,
The Meaning of Participation and of Demands for It: A Preliminary Survey of the
Conceptual Issues, in PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS: NOMOS XVI, supra note 44, at 56,59.
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Furthermore, an individual's political participation is more likely
to be effective when he or she has the opportunity to learn from
experience and thereby develop sound political judgment and strong
political skills.47 These kinds of benefits are more readily available
when the local political community is also stable and relatively
permanent. If the community's boundaries or populace change too
often or too dramatically, not only will the relevant cast of political
characters change, but its problems will change as well. These kinds
of changes, at least when they are significant, impair citizens' political
learning and complicate their acquisition of political judgment.
A particularly pertinent example of this civic training
justification is Nancy Schwartz's defense of single-member election
districts as the ideal arena for producing good democratic citizens. In
The Blue Guitar,4 Schwartz argues that modem-day citizenship
"requires specific arenas for its exercise," and that these arenas must
be of an appropriate size. An arena too large, such as a world state,
would forfeit "the possibility of direct citizen interaction;" an arena
too small, such as a town meeting, would have "neither the diversity
nor the power to be a meaningful totality" under the circumstances of
modem life.49 In this setting, the collective selection of a political
representative continually reconstitutes the polity: "[i]t is a process in
which a people makes a choice about how it will be recognized
politically, and hence becomes self-conscious about who they are
collectively."5 The single-member districts of the Anglo-American
system, Schwartz argues,
best encourage the development of political individuality,
the civic status of being a citizen who retains his or her own
particular loyalties yet acknowledges membership in the
whole. By having set boundaries to a district one defines a
relevant constituency not just by one aspect of its life at a
moment in time but rather by the totality of its political life
over the years.5'
For Schwartz, then, the standard American election district is the best
civic training ground for producing good democratic citizens,
provided it is of appropriate size and sufficient permanence.
47. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 22 (1944).
48. NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, THE BLUE GUITAR: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND
COMMUNITY 73 (1988).
49. Id.




Another group of theories focuses even more strongly on the
salience of the place in which members of a community live their
political lives; such theories thus deal with the situatedness of the
political subject in its most literal sense. As Hannah Arendt notably
observed, "human life in so far as it is actively doing something, is
always rooted in a world of men and of man-made things which it
never leaves or altogether transcends. '52 The physical, public realm is
a crucial space for the conduct of politics, Arendt argued, because it is
the place in which persons who are different can join in common
recognition of common objects, a fundamental condition of political
community 3 The experience of place is necessarily social and
collective, and thus political. In the most basic sense, place shapes
politics because it frames issues as politically salient, both in virtue of
the physical characteristics of the place,55 but more fundamentally
because "[t]he neighborhood is ... the landscape of persons with
whom one habitually deals, or with whom one may well have to deal.
These are the people to whom one must, with rare exceptions, be
civil;"56 one must, that is to say, relate to them politically. Places
could be interchangeable as venues for politics only if these factors
were largely irrelevant to politics-"if where I do most of my living,
hence my relations to others in the same locale, were not particularly
important for that living.
'57
A final group of theories that supports an emphasis on local
political community falls under the heading of what I call "viewpoint
pluralism." Unlike interest pluralism, which postulates a political
arena in which diverse interests compete for satisfaction, viewpoint
pluralism holds that a healthy politics is characterized by general
contemplation and open, serious discussion of a wide diversity of
political viewpoints. Theories of viewpoint pluralism range from
52. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22 (1958).
53. Id. at 57-58; see also Alexandra Kogl, Toward a Democratic Theory of Place:
Place and the Public Realm 1-5 (Aug. 31, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, delivered at
American Political Science Association Annual Meeting), available at
http:llpro.harvard.eduabstracts002/002022KoglAlexan.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
54. EDWARD S. CASEY, GETTING BACK INTO PLACE: TOWARD A RENEWED
UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLACE-WORLD 31 (1993) ("We partake of places in
common-and reshape them in common. The culture that characterizes and shapes a
given place is a shared culture, not merely superimposed upon that place but part of its
very facticity.").
55. PETER DREIR ET AL., PLACE MATrERS: METROPOLITICS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY Cl. 1 (2001).
56. Cahoone, supra note 6, at 24.
57. Id. at 15.
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minimal versions focused relatively narrowly on justifying
diversification of legislative representation,58 to more elaborate
versions associated with theories of deliberative democracy in which
legislative diversification is a central component of a more
comprehensive program of political reform. 9 In all their varieties,
however, theories of viewpoint pluralism strive to justify a politics in
which all serious points of view are included and treated respectfully
in public political discourse.6°
If a political community is the collective bearer of some
particular point of view, then viewpoint pluralism offers a strong
justification for treating local communities respectfully, individually,
and equally. In viewpoint pluralism, social diversity arises not so
much because communities' different situations provide them with
distinct sets of interests (though this may occur), but because their
differing situations cause their members to develop distinct, sincerely
held, and epistemologically valid viewpoints.6' Views held by political
communities are, according to viewpoint pluralism, entitled to a
respectful hearing in decision-making bodies, and each view is to be
accorded weight not on the basis of the number of people or
communities holding or expressing it, but on its merits. Viewpoint
pluralism thus furnishes a potentially strong justification not only for
respecting the integrity of enduring local political communities, but
for treating them equally as representatives of the viewpoints they
hold.62
58. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994); WILL KYMLICKA,
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995);
ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE (1995).
59. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996); Joshua
Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17 (Alan Hamlin & Philip Pettit eds., 1989).
60. For a fuller discussion, see James A. Gardner, Democratic Institutions of View
Pluralism (Aug. 31, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, delivered at American Political
Science Association Annual Meeting) (on file with author).
61. PHILLIPS, supra note 58; IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE (1990); Iris Marion Young, Difference As a Resource for Democratic
Communication, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS
383 (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997).
62. It might be objected that communal representation is in fact antithetical to any
serious concept of viewpoint pluralism because legislative representation of communities
suppresses representation of viewpoints held by minorities within the represented
communities, thereby narrowing the range of viewpoints that will achieve consideration in
legislative deliberations. This is a potentially serious objection to which I cannot fully
respond here. Briefly, however, I do not find it troubling for the following reasons. The
strength of this objection depends upon the validity of two underlying assumptions: (1)
the legislature is preferable to the local community as a forum for considering and
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C. Communal Representation: Equality or Proportionality?
Let us assume for the moment that at least some of these
theories have some merit, and that there are potential benefits to be
gained from designing legal institutions in a way that respects and
fosters the development of local political community. How, then,
might an electoral system be legally structured so as to achieve some
of these benefits?
Although there are undoubtedly numerous ways to
institutionalize the benefits of local political community, any such
system, in light of the preceding discussion, would have to possess a
few salient characteristics. First, to assure proper deference to the
significance of locality in political life, such a system would have to
treat local politics as an important constitutive element of individual
and communal identity. Second, to provide a degree of autonomy
sufficient to make local community meaningful, it would have to treat
political boundaries as at least potentially significant reference points
for collective self-definition. Third, to assure the continuing stability
and integrity of local political communities, such a system would have
to permit local communities to maintain a distinct political identity by
acting as coherent wholes regardless of their size.
These conditions have definite ramifications for the structuring
of electoral institutions. They are clearly inconsistent with the kind of
instrumentalism, endorsed by the Court, that permits states to
manipulate at will the boundaries, powers, and populations of local
political jurisdictions as a matter of administrative convenience.63
Instead, they seem to point toward a communal rather than individual
basis of representation in national, state, and local legislatures. It
debating political viewpoints; and (2) legislative decision-making is improved by
consideration of the greatest possible number of different viewpoints. Each of these
assumptions presents significant problems. First, most conceptions of viewpoint pluralism
contemplate that the benefits of political deliberation materialize when deliberation is
conducted by citizens, not by legislators. See, e.g., BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG
DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); Cohen, supra note 59,
at 17-34; HABERMAS, supra note 59. Local communities would seem to make better
forums for meaningful citizen deliberation than artificial election districts precisely
because they are communities, that is, entities whose members already possess a set of
established relations that make meaningful political deliberation possible. Second, it is not
the case that legislative deliberations are improved by introduction of every conceivable
viewpoint, no matter how ill-considered or unmeritorious; only the introduction of good
viewpoints improves legislative debate. So long as it is conducted according to the ground
rules of open, respectful debate, communal representation might actually serve as a useful
filtering device that would transmit to the legislature only the better viewpoints, filtering
out locally the poorly considered ones.
63. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907).
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must be borne in mind that legal frameworks structuring politics are
not themselves capable of summoning into existence any particular
kind of politics. They are, however, capable of impeding or
facilitating efforts by citizens or governments to bring about a politics
which they otherwise wish to establish.' 4 In this context, some kind of
system of communal representation thus seems to be the structure
best suited to facilitate the creation of a meaningful local politics,
should a state or locality wish to attempt to do so.
Although there may be many ways in which a system of
communal representation could be structured, history seems to
furnish two principal examples. One system treats all
subcommunities of the whole as equal, regardless of their
characteristics, by providing each with the same number of
representatives-a true system of one community, one vote. The
other system recognizes subcommunities as the relevant unit of
representation, but allocates them different numbers of
representatives depending upon certain qualities, typically
population. Both kinds appear frequently in Anglo-American
history. We have already seen the medieval system of equality in
communal representation, which was replicated in the American
colonies and in many of the earliest post-revolutionary state
legislatures. The same system also was employed in the Continental
Congress under the Articles of Confederation65 and in many state
senates prior to Baker v. Carr,66 and exists today in the United States
Senate.67 On the other hand, systems of communal representation
have also been employed in the United States in which
subcommunities are represented not equally, but in rough proportion
to their populations. Representation of states in the House of
Representatives was from the beginning of this type,68 as was
representation in many state assemblies before the Court's ruling in
Baker.69
One question often raised regarding the latter, roughly
proportional kind of representation is whether such a system really
represents communities, or something else-people, perhaps, or
64. See James A. Gardner, Can Party Politics Be Virtuous?, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 667,
670 (2000); James A. Gardner, ikadison's Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of
Electoral Systems, 86 IowA L. REV. 87 (2000) [hereinafter Gardner, Madison's Hope].
65. Articles of Confederation, art. 5, § 4 (1778) ("[E]ach State shall have one vote.").
66. 14 THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 4, at 58-62.
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cI. 1.
68. Id. §2, cl. 3.
69. 14 THE BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 4, at 58-62.
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wealth, or power. The Framers, for example, believed that the
Senate's equality of state representation would make it a body in
which political subcommunities-states-were represented in their
capacity as political communities. The House's proportionality, in
contrast, would render it a body that represented people, despite the
fact that representation was formally allocated among states rather
than groups of individuals. 70 Similarly, the Three-fifths Clause, which
calculated representable state populations by adding to the number of
free persons three-fifths of all slaves,7 1 was widely understood to
implement a compromise under the terms of which the House would
represent a mix of people and property.72
I do not propose to enter into this metaphysical discussion about
what is properly understood to be represented in a legislative body.
Instead, I want to ask a more directly pertinent question: does the
choice of a system of strict equality or proportionality of community
representation have any ramifications for the quality of politics
practiced in the subcommunities themselves? If the contemporary
goal of communal representation is to facilitate the development of a
meaningful local political community with a satisfying politics, it is
important to know whether the way in which communities are
represented in the legislature has any impact on achievement of that
goal. Specifically, the concern is this: it would hardly do to reject a
liberal, cosmopolitan politics of self-interest by establishing a strong
system of local political community, only to have such a politics
reappear within local communities as an indirect result of incentives
created by the nature of state or national legislative politics.
As an initial matter, there seems to be no necessary connection
between the cultivation of a meaningful community-centered politics
at the local level, on one hand, and the kind of politics in which the
various community representatives may engage among themselves,
on the other. No matter how communities choose their
representatives, communal representation is just as consistent with a
supralocal legislative politics of crass self-interest as it is with a
legislative politics of virtuous and deliberative pursuit of the common
good. On the other hand, it is possible that proportional rather than
equal representation of communities tends to be more congenial to
one kind of politics than another. If so, then certain kinds of
70. Compare 2 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 43-50 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987) (debates concerning the basis of representation in the House), with id.
at 183-208 (same concerning the Senate).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
72. See 2 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 70, at 87-144.
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representatives are likely to be more effective than others at the kind
of legislative politics so produced. This could in turn affect the nature
of politics within the represented communities by giving citizens
incentives to pick one kind of representative over another, and to
marshal some kinds of reasons for their choices and not others.
These are considerations that go to the heart of political life in a local
community.
For reasons that I have elaborated elsewhere,73 I am inclined to
think that proportional representation is in general more congenial to
the establishment and maintenance of a liberal politics of self-interest
than to a politics of developmental, deliberative, or viewpoint-plural
democracy. When communal representation is proportional,
numbers count in ways they do not when representation is equal.
When one community has more representatives than another, larger
communities may carry legislative decisions by relying more on their
own voting strength than is possible when communities are
represented equally. This means that winning coalitions can be built
around representatives of fewer communities, representing fewer
viewpoints. Deliberation, persuasion, and inclusion become less
necessary, and thus less useful; decisions may be carried as much by
the exercise of raw, instrumental power as on their merits.
Some support for this supposition may be drawn from
observations of existing political institutions. It is often said, for
example, that the United States Senate is a more deliberative body
than the House of Representatives. I would be the last to accuse the
Senate of engaging in the highest quality politics, and if the quality of
politics is actually better there than in the House it might well be due
to factors other than the equality of representation in the Senate, such
as the length of terms and corresponding infrequency of the need to
run for reelection. Nevertheless, it is also possible that the need to
attract representatives from a wider array of political subcommunities
requires a kind of coalition building, inclusiveness, and consequent
deliberativeness that is not necessarily mandatory in the House,
where the power of numbers may be easier to wield.
Better evidence may come from the experience of other nations
with consociationalism, a form of government employed in the
Netherlands,74 Belgium,75 and possibly other nations including
73. Gardner, Madison's Hope, supra note 64.
74. AREND LIJPHART, THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS (2d ed. 1975).
75. CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE IN BELGIUM: THE DYNAMICS OF A CULTURALLY
DIVIDED SOCIETY (Arend Lijphart ed., 1981).
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Switzerland, Canada, and India.76 Consociationalism is a structure
that permits a measure of democracy in societies that are deeply
divided by the kinds of ethnic, cultural, or religious cleavages that
prove difficult to transcend in the give and take of ordinary
democratic politics. Its purpose is to create an arrangement that
permits the constituent communities of a divided nation to govern by
a mutual accommodation in which each community has a significant
and permanent say in the formation of government policies.
According to Arend Lijphart, its leading student, consociationalism's
most important characteristic is government by a "grand coalition" of
leaders from each significant segment of the plural society.
77
When the constituent communities of a consociational nation are
of different sizes, Lijphart observes, they will often demand some
form of proportionality in communal representation.78 Yet the
politics that emerges from proportional representation of
communities in consociationalism, Lijphardt claims, is one
characterized by bargaining, logrolling, and, worst of all, closed-door
decision making by high-level leaders from each group.79 This
arrangement is conducive to maintaining stability, because "in
intimate and secret negotiations the likelihood of achieving a
[mutually satisfactory] package deal is maximized";80 but this stability
clearly is purchased at some cost to the democratic quality of
consociational politics.
If the proportional variety of communal representation yields a
legislative politics of what amounts essentially to interest pluralism,
then the best representatives any community can send to the
legislature are those most capable of advancing the community's
interests in the give and take of interest-based bargaining. These are
not likely to be the same people the community would select to
represent it in a deliberative legislature whose members were
76. Hans Daalder, On Building Consociational Nations: The Cases of the Netherlands
and Switzerland, in CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN
SEGMENTED SOCIETIES 107, 107-24 (Kenneth McRae ed., 1974) (Switzerland);
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra, at 235-99 (Canada); Arend Lijphart, The Puzzle
of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 258 (1996)
(India). The concept of consociationalism has occasionally been criticized for being too
indeterminate, and thus allowing too many nations to qualify as consociational. See, e.g.,
Brian Barry, The Consociational Model and Its Dangers, 3 EUR. J. POL. RES. 393 (1975);
Ian S. Lustick, Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism, 50 WORLD POL. 88 (1997).
77. AREND LUPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIEs: A COMPARATIVE
EXPLORATION 25-36 (1977).
78. Id. at 38-41.
79. Id. at 39-40.
80. Id. at 40.
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committed to open, respectful listening and the pursuit of consensus
based on mutual understanding.8 ' It also seems likely that the kind of
local politics most conducive to the selection of one or the other kind
of legislator might differ substantially. While there is perhaps no
necessary conflict in the notion that a deliberative local politics could
produce an instrumental representative, it does not seem the most
natural or likely of arrangements. For these reasons, it strikes me as
plausible to conclude, at least provisionally, that the form of
communal representation best suited to secure the benefits of strong
local political community is a system of one community, one vote.
III. Is ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE NECESSARILY INCOMPATIBLE
WITH POLITICAL COMMuNITY?
Having laid out the major differences between the one-person,
one-vote and one-community, one-vote approaches to political
representation, I turn now to a more practical issue. The two systems
of representation are clearly in tension at a theoretical level. But
does this tension inevitably translate in practice into actual
incompatibility? More specifically, does the use of a one-person, one-
vote system necessarily undermine the formation of meaningful local
political communities? In this part, I consider two possible ways in
which the incompatibility problem might be avoided. First, perhaps it
is possible to implement a one-person, one-vote system in a way that
is sensitive to the preservation of existing political communities,
potentially allowing them to survive and flourish in the long term.
Second, and more fundamentally, perhaps there is no real
contradiction between one person, one vote and political community
because a genuinely local, communal politics is simply impossible in
the contemporary United States.
A. Respect for Existing Local Political Communities: The Center-
Periphery Model
In developing the one-person, one-vote principle in actual cases,
the Supreme Court has introduced some flexibility into the doctrine
for the express purpose of permitting states to show greater respect
for existing local political communities than a strict application of the
doctrine might otherwise allow. In the most national-oriented
elections to which the doctrine applies-elections for the United
States House of Representatives-the Court has sternly required that
81. See sources cited supra notes 58,60.
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congressional election districts within a state be of nearly precisely
equal population.82 The more rigidly this requirement is enforced, of
course, the more necessary it becomes to break up recognized local
political communities because their populations fail to add up to the
required numbers.
In state and local districting, however, the Court has taken a
somewhat more lenient approach. There, the Court requires only
that election districts be "as nearly of equal population as
practicable." 83 In practice, the Court is routinely willing to tolerate
deviations of up to ten percent from the ideal population
distribution. 4 Although the Court allows states this latitude, it
requires deviations from strict equality to be justified by valid
reasons. Among the reasons that the Court has approved for
deviating from the strictest application of one person, one vote are
two that seem pertinent here: maintaining the integrity of political
subdivisions and keeping intact communities of interest. 6 Both of
these exceptions seem calculated to provide limited protection for
local political communities by granting redistricters a degree of
flexibility in line-drawing which they might on occasion invoke to
avoid splitting identifiable political communities among more than
one election district.
Do these doctrinal exceptions to the strict requirement of
population equality make the one-person, one-vote standard in
practice sufficiently sensitive to the values of political community to
rescue it from the charge that it thwarts the establishment and
maintenance of meaningful local political communities? Probably
not. In the first place, the exception for preserving "communities of
interest" seems largely irrelevant to any thick concept of meaningful
political community. To speak of a community of interest is to
presuppose a thin form of community based on nothing more than
shared interests-we are all poor, perhaps, and thus share an interest
in poverty programs; or we are all riparian homeowners and thus
share an interest in flood protection. A shared interest is central to
82. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,730 (1983).
83. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,577 (1964).
84. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 320-33 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735, 740-51 (1973). In Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43 (1983), the Court
suggested that state apportionment plans with population deviations below ten percent are
prima facie valid under the one-person, one-vote standard.
85. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 321-29; Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,974 (1996).
86. Bush, 517 U.S. at 966; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,919-20 (1995).
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an advocacy organization, perhaps, but it hardly describes a three-
dimensional political community.
The exception for recognized political subdivisions seems more
promising. A town, village, or city, perhaps even a county, is capable
of describing not merely a set of acknowledged borders but also, at
times, a genuine political community whose members share a history
and collective sense of identity. Moreover, by taking the position that
political subdivisions are entitled to some degree of integrity, the
Court treats them as natural, almost as though a community were a
feature of the landscape itself, like a river or a mountain ridge, that
divides people into organically distinct groupings.
This view is notably at odds with the Court's generally
instrumental approach to local boundaries in one-person, one-vote
cases.87 Furthermore, the Court has complicated the discrepancy by
consistently explaining the exception for political subdivisions in
surprisingly instrumental terms. For example, in Bush v. Vera, the
Court criticized a Texas districting plan for exhibiting "utter disregard
of city limits, local election precincts and voter tabulation district
lines.""8  This was bad, the Court explained, because professional
campaigners "had to carry a map to identify the district lines," and
because it "created administrative headaches for local election
officials." 9  The disruption of local community does not figure
prominently in the Court's analysis. More to the point, however, is
that the Court's apparently grudging willingness to recognize the
value of political community seems directly at odds with its
unwillingness to relax the equipopulation requirement of one person,
one vote by more than ten percent and its insistence on decennial
restructuring of political boundaries, both of which enhance the
likelihood of disrupting the integrity of established political
communities. If a political community is organic, like a river, it is a
river that may be dammed or redirected to a very great extent.
There may be, however, a possible way to reconcile the Court's
seemingly contradictory impulses if we conceive of a political
community as comprising not a uniform whole throughout its
geographical extent, but rather a center and a periphery. At the core,
and smaller than the whole, is the heart of the community, the place
87. Richard Thompson Ford has well described the Court's longstanding vacillation
between treating political boundaries as instrumentally meaningless and as organically
meaningful. See Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography
in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1841, 1877-78 (1994).
88. Bush, 517 U.S. at 974.
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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where citizens develop meaningful attachments to one another and
lead shared political lives. Farther out are the hinterlands, places
connected to the political center by ties of economics, culture, and
information, for example, but less so by the kinds of ties characteristic
of a common political life. These peripheral areas thus need not be
considered an integral part of the relevant political community.
When we think, say, of ancient Athens, history's quintessential
political community, we think of the Acropolis, and perhaps the
fortified city surrounding it that comprised the city of Athens proper.
We do not think much about the Piraeus, the Athenian harbor two
miles to the west, or about the outlying countryside of Attica which
contained crucial Athenian farmlands and numerous smaller towns.9 0
Would Athens have been any the less Athens if some outlying tract of
farmland were lopped off and reassigned to neighboring Megara or
Boeotia? Perhaps the Court takes the same view of American
political jurisdictions: outlying areas form a political as much as a
geographical periphery, and reassigning them from one district to
another simply does not do much damage to the true political
community at the center.
If the Court really has been thinking in these terms, it would
represent a truly dramatic reversal of the usual American approach
not only to apportionment, but to rural life itself. Before Baker
opened up the subject to judicial inquiry, malapportioned state
legislatures tended to be dominated by rural interests because the
greatest deviations from population equality were most often caused
by the rapid growth of cities in the first half of the twentieth century.
In American political thought, however, this may not have been
considered the greatest of sins. Cities were viewed suspiciously in
Jeffersonian and then Progressive ideology as incubators of political
dependence. 91 City life was considered shallow and ephemeral
90. See J.B. BURY & RUSSELL MEIGGS, A HISTORY OF GREECE TO THE DEATH OF
ALEXANDER THE GREAT 235-38 (4th ed. 1975).
91. As Jefferson put it:
Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age
nor nation has furnished an example. It is the mark set on those, who... for
their subsistence, depend for it on casualties and caprice of customers.
Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and
prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.... The mobs of great cities add
just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the
human body.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Virginia (1782), reprinted in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 259-60 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1993).
Regarding the Progressive view, which feared cities as havens of dependent immigrants
not schooled in American democratic traditions, see, for example, RICHARD
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compared to the sturdy permanence of country life. A center-
periphery model of political community in the apportionment context
would reverse that equation. It would now be the city that comprised
the stable and enduring political community, while outlying rural
areas could be swapped freely among city-dominated districts without
significant loss of political connection and community. The Court's
approach would now be as urban in outlook as the prior approach
was rural.
In any event, I think that the center-periphery model of political
community ultimately cannot dissolve successfully the apparent
conflict between one person, one vote and the maintenance of strong
local political communities. First, even if the model might hold some
appeal in the context of state legislative apportionment, it has no
obvious application to local apportionment. The doctrine of one
person, one vote applies not just to state legislatures, but also to local
councils and boards, including the division into wards or precincts of
small cities and rural townships. Does a bedroom suburb have an
identifiable center and periphery? Perhaps, but the concept seems
too attenuated to do any real work here.
Second, the center-periphery notion may not accurately describe
many political communities. It could well be that the citizens of a
town, a village, or a city collectively identify themselves as a single
community, in which case the imposition of the center-periphery
model to justify doling out pieces of the jurisdiction to its neighbors
would represent a clear violation of the community's integrity. In this
respect, the center-periphery model does not take sufficiently
seriously the potential meaningfulness of boundaries or place, and as
a result consigns some groups to disaffiliation and transience.
92
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the decennial
redistricting process itself may be intrinsically inconsistent with a
respect for the integrity of local political community. One of the most
consistent findings of those who study the reapportionment process is
that it is conducted strategically, by those who already hold power,
with an eye toward keeping or gaining power.93 As Robert Dixon
observed, all districting is in some sense gerrymandering: 94 someone
stands to gain or lose from any conceivable redrawing of district lines.
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 7-9 (1955); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER 1877-1920, at 77-79 (1967).
92. ANDERSON, supra note 20.
93. See, e.g., BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE (1984).
94. ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT
IN LAW AND POLITICS 462 (1968).
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If that is the case, then it may simply be impossible for the
redistricting process to proceed on any basis other than the pursuit of
political self-interest. In that setting, providing local political
communities with a limited safe harbor, as the Court has done, may
amount to whistling in the wind.
B. Is a Local, Communal Politics Even Possible?
I want now to touch briefly upon a much more fundamental
objection to the contradiction that I have been exploring between one
person, one vote and the cultivation of local political community.
The objection is this: no actual contradiction between these
principles can ever appear because the kind of meaningful local
political community contemplated by non-liberal democratic theory
is, at least in the contemporary United States, impossible; it simply
does not and cannot exist.
This is a serious and potentially valid objection. Community in
the United States has always had an element of transience. American
society developed to some degree under the influence of the frontier:
people have always felt they could pick up, move someplace else, and
start over.95  Many have done so. According to census figures,
seventeen million Americans-more than one in twenty-moved to
their present county of residence within the last year alone.96 At least
forty percent of Americans live in a political community different
from the one into which they were born.97 Indeed, the U.S.
Constitution confers upon all Americans an individual right to
migrate internally. 8
The possibility of a distinctive local identity is under siege from
many other directions. Today, twenty-three corporations of
95. FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1976).
This view has been called into question by more contemporary historians of the American
West. See, e.g., PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE
UNBROKEN PAST OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1987); TRAILS: TOWARD A NEW WESTERN
HISTORY (Patricia Nelson Limerick et al. eds., 1991).
96. U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of Selected Social Characteristics: 2000,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/BasicFactsServlet (last visited Jan. 25, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
97. Id. The number is probably much higher, as the Census Bureau tracks movement
only from county to county. Movement from town to town is not reported nationally.
98. See U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States... are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside."); Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498-504 (1999) (recognizing the right to travel as a privilege or
immunity of U.S. citizenship); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969)
(recognizing a constitutional right to travel); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283,
305-10 (1849) (holding that states cannot restrict the interstate movement of persons).
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nationwide reach control most of the more than 25,000 media outlets
in the United States.99 The daily newspaper business is dominated by
fourteen companies.'1° Three companies own a majority of the
nation's magazines and six own a majority of its book publishers.
Three companies own a majority of television stations; four own a
majority of movie studios. 01 Control over the images that Americans
see each day, the images that provide them with much of their basic
stock of concepts, is concentrated in the hands of just a few national
corporations.
Things are much the same in the world of commerce. By the
mid-1970s, 15,000 shopping centers had been built, accounting for
nearly half of the nation's retail sales. Nearly a third of this amount
was taken in by 800 large regional malls."° The mall has become not
only a powerful economic engine, but "a national common
denominator, an experience few could not relate to.""03 If local
customs, beliefs and ways of life are somehow embodied or reflected
in the goods produced, sold, and consumed in a place, then local
variations across the nation are being flattened by a single consumer
culture of national scale.' 4 It is questionable whether distinctively
local community can survive such an onslaught.
Another possible difficulty is that the typical American election
district may be too large to comprise a genuine community. After the
current round of redistricting, the average congressional district will
contain nearly 650,000 people.0  The average state assembly district
in California will contain over 420,000 people; in Texas approximately
144,000; in North Carolina more than 70,000.06 On the other hand,
local legislative districts may contain numbers small enough to be
consistent with the formation of meaningful local political
99. BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 4 (4th ed. 1992).
100. Id. at 18,23-24.
101. Id. at 18.
102. BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOwN, INC.: How
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 69 (1989).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., PETER APPLEBOME, DIXIE RISING: How THE SOUTH IS SHAPING
AMERICAN VALUES, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 15 (1996) ("No one who compares the
segregated, largely rural South of just three decades ago and the strip-mailed South of
Tex-Mex chains, bagel shops, and designer coffee kiosks today could fail to see that the
South now is part of a national commercial culture in a way that it never was in the past.").
105. U.S. Census Bureau, Census Brief, http:llwww.census.gov/prodl200lpubs/c2kbrOl-
7.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
106. All population data from the 2000 census was obtained from www.census.gov. See
U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, http:llwww.census.gov/populationlwww/censusdatal




communities. An average ward in the city of Buffalo, New York, for
example, contains about 32,500 people,"7 and districts in smaller
communities may contain substantially fewer people.
It might also be argued that an election district cannot comprise
a genuine community because politics, in contemporary America, is
too trivial a basis upon which to constitute a meaningful communal
life. Perhaps American politics simply is, empirically, a thin, interest-
based politics:0 8 perhaps we are all self-interested utility-maximizers
now. There is a strand of constitutional doctrine that seems to
suggest quite strongly that a genuinely communal life is constituted by
private associations, defined mostly as intimate associations such as
family, religious groups, private clubs, and the like.1°9 The Court's
jurisprudence in these areas may thus create a dichotomy whereby
public communities may be rearranged at will because they are by
definition thin, while presumptively thick private associations can
almost never be disrupted by the state.
All of these things may well be true: the United States today
may have little in the way of meaningful, local, public community, so
that when redistricters break up counties, towns, and city
neighborhoods they are not breaking up anything of real significance.
Yet it is far from clear that these facts, if they are facts, justify the
Court's application of the one-person, one-vote doctrine so as to
preclude a state or locality from attempting to create a more
meaningful local politics if it wishes to do so. As things now stand,
the one-person, one-vote doctrine prevents a state from adopting a
representational system of one community, one vote, or even any
weaker system of communal representation that would accord more
respect to the integrity of local communities than the one-person,
one-vote doctrine presently permits. What must be justified, it seems
to me, is the Court's application of the doctrine in a way that
107. Based on 2000 municipal population, the city was divided into nine wards. See
City of Buffalo, District Listing, at http://www.cityjbuffalo.com/document_31_5.html (last
visited Jan. 25,2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); U.S. Census Bureau,
Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
BasicFactsServlet (last visited Jan. 25, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
108. If a general lack of knowledge concerning political issues is evidence of a thin
politics, then political scientists have been documenting such thinness since The American
Voter, which revealed systematically the public's general ignorance about government
policies, political issues, candidates, and the positions taken by candidates on issues of the
day. See ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960).
109. E.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557, 568-70 (1995); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-29 (1984);
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,498-506 (1977).
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precludes states and localities from attempting to foster a meaningful
local politics, and that commits us everywhere, at every level, to the
kind of liberal, national political life that one person, one vote tends
to foster.
IV. JUSTIFYING THE SUPPRESSION OF LOCAL POLITICAL
COMMUNITY
The United States Supreme Court has long maintained, in many
cases arising in many different contexts, that states have enormous
discretion in structuring their political institutions. They may create
offices as they wish, making them elective or appointive." 0 They may
create local governments and structure them in a great variety of
ways, granting or withdrawing powers as expediency dictates. 1' They
may treat local jurisdictions instrumentally, altering their boundaries
and powers as they see fit,1 2 or they may treat local jurisdictions as
having greater significance and permanence, a decision which federal
courts are then bound to respect."3 If states have such discretion in
so many other areas, why, then, are they denied the discretion to
attempt to foster meaningful local political life through a system of
communal representation such as one community, one vote? Why, in
other words, is a cosmopolitan uniformity to be preferred to
communal diversity and differentiation, even at the cost of sacrificing
the many civic benefits that might accrue from a strong, independent
local politics?
One possible justification for striking the balance in this way is
suggested by the historical context in which the Court developed the
one-person, one-vote doctrine. In a recent book, Lucas A. Powe, Jr.,
argues that the jurisprudence of the Warren Court was directed
overwhelmingly at a single goal: breaking the back of southern
regionalism."4  The "local regime of race," he writes, "was
110. Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8 (1982); Fortson v. Morris,
385 U.S. 231, 234 (1966).
111. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 74 (1978); Avery v.
Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968); Sailors v. Bd. of Educ., 387 U.S. 105, 110-11
(1967).
112. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 179 (1907) (upholding the consolidation of
two neighboring cities).
113. See Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action, 430 U.S. 259,271-72 (1976) (upholding
a New York law granting counties more organization independence from cities); Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974) (overturning a desegregation plan that addressed
Detroit's problems on a metropolitan basis).




nationalized with a single operative standard for the entire country.
But the effort was not a national one. It was directed exclusively at
the South and was designed to force the South to conform to
northern-that is, national-norms." ' s Interestingly, Powe views the
Court's one-person, one-vote jurisprudence as one of the few areas in
which the Court attacked a nationwide rather than a regional,
southern problem; its decisions, he argues, "were explicitly designed
to transfer political power from rural America to urban America."" 6
Yet perhaps Powe misses an important connection between one
person, one vote and the Court's "assault on the South as a unique
legal and cultural region.""17 If, as I have argued, strong systems of
communal representation such as one community, one vote are more
conducive to the creation and preservation of distinctive local
political communities, then such systems may provide the conditions
in which a local political culture of racial caste can flourish.
Nationalization and cosmopolitanism have long been among the
strategies invoked by the civil rights movement against the local
particularism of racial discrimination." 8 To the extent that the one-
person, one-vote standard encourages a politics that is liberal and
national, it too may serve as a weapon against racialism.
There is a significant problem with this account, however. If the
one-person, one-vote standard was meant to disrupt local community
in the belief that local autonomy and distinctiveness too easily serve
as incubators of racial discrimination, the standard has been a
notorious flop. In practice, the decennial districting process has had
just the opposite effect: it has provided frequent opportunities for
new and creative forms of racial discrimination. Black citizens have
been packed into heavily black districts and scattered among heavily
white ones, depending upon the political objectives of redistricters.
The Court's current, utterly confused jurisprudence under the Voting
Rights Act concerning the appropriate uses of racial criteria in the
districting process" 9 is nothing if not testament to the way that
reapportionment has become thoroughly racialized. And the Court's
growing hostility to national administration of southern redistricting
115. Id.
116. Il at 493.
117. I& at 490.
118. In a classic work, the pioneering political scientist E.E. Schattschneider argued
that manipulation of the level at which problems get resolved is a universal tactic of
politics. E.E. SCHATrSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW
OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 78-96 (1960).
119. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
923 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630,653-57 (1993).
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by the Justice Department 120 seems to signal a loss of faith in
nationalizing legal institutions as a means of suppressing a local
politics of racial inequality.
A second possible justification for insisting on liberal nationalism
at the expense of strong local community might be that the latter
promotes disruptive differences capable of weakening larger
communities that are more important in today's world. Benjamin
Barber has made such an argument in his book Jihad vs. McWorld.
1 21
There, Barber argues that the world is simultaneously disintegrating
into ethnic, religious, and local particularism (jihad), and becoming
melded by global communication and global capitalism into a single
metaculture (McWorld). Barber points out that these opposing
trends are united by their assault on the nation-state as the primary
political, social, and economic organizing unit of modem life. He
finds this troubling on the ground that the nation-state has been
instrumental in creating and maintaining not only democracy, but also
the kind of flourishing liberal humanhood created by democratic
citizenship and civil society.
If Barber is correct, then perhaps we have reason to fear political
institutions capable of fostering strong and independent local political
cultures. The nationalizing doctrine of one person, one vote may thus
implement a desirable level of protection for the integrity of the
nation against a dangerous splintering into distinctive local
communities. In a nation with a history of ideological support for
secession as a means of resolving political differences among regions,
perhaps such a precaution makes sense.
If either of these reasons sufficiently justifies promoting liberal
cosmopolitanism, the result certainly comes at a price. In the first
place, as I have repeatedly emphasized, a liberal, nationalizing politics
sacrifices the many potential civic and personal benefits associated
with strong local political community. These costs include lost
opportunities for citizens to develop personal political skills,
awareness, and judgment; to experience a sense of agency and self-
mastery by shaping their own lives through meaningful local political
participation; and to enjoy the potential satisfactions of becoming,
and relating to others as, citizens in the thickest sense of the term. In
the second place, the liberal, national politics that substitutes for the
local variety tends toward the opposite extreme: a politics of
120. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (severely criticizing the Justice
Department for attempting to maximize the number of majority-minority districts).
121. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD (1995).
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detached, rational self-interest. This kind of politics could not be
more different from the local variety. It encourages citizens to think
about their own interests first, to pay less attention to the common
welfare, to disengage from active political participation, and to retire
into private rather than public life.
I do not intend by any means to suggest that any or all of these
consequences should be laid at the feet of the one-person, one-vote
doctrine. That doctrine is, after all, only one small piece of a
comprehensive legal regulatory structure for the American political
process, and other aspects of this system undoubtedly contribute to
the institutionalization of a liberal politics of self-interest."2 More
importantly, though, such a politics may simply be an unavoidable
price of modem life: self-interest just may be the only realistic basis
upon which political relations may be successfully conducted in the
kind of immense, mass democracy characteristic of modem Western
society. If that should turn out to be the case, then the one-person,
one-vote doctrine should not be viewed as an impediment to the
improvement of politics, but as a concession to the inevitable.
122. So I have argued in the sources cited supra note 64.
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